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Abstract 
 
A CEO is capable of steering a company towards successful financial years however no two 
Chief Executive Officers are alike. CEOs have diverse background and demographic 
characteristics that might result in a different strategic decision-making approach that, in 
turn, could affect the firm performance.  
The aim of the study was to examine how strong the impact of a CEO’s executive age, 
executive experience and executive busyness on the firm performance in the United States 
of America is. Additionally, the study should state whether investors should take a CEO’s 
characteristics into consideration when evaluating an investment option.  
The theoretical framework is based on online articles in scientific journals, scientific 
studies, websites that deal with financial and economic issues and encyclopedias. The 
empirical part was based on one specific study and had a closer look at four S&P 500 
companies. To conduct the empirical part, the financial websites Forbes and Reuters as 
well as the homepages of the companies and financial information from the company’s 
annual reports were incorporated.  
The result of the study is the statement that a CEO’s executive age, executive experience 
and executive busyness has a rather weak impact on the performance of firms operating 
within the United States of America. This statement is especially backed up by the 
empirical part, which showed that other factors have a more significant impact on the firm 
performance than a CEO’s characteristics. Moreover, the study results in saying that 
investors should not necessarily keep a CEO’s characteristics in mind when evaluating an 
investment option.  
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1 Introduction 
According to the Oxford Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary (w.y.), a CEO (Chief Executive 
Officer) is the person with the highest rank in a business company. In other words, the Chief 
Executive Officer takes the highest position in corporate management and is not only 
responsible for the operations of the business company, but also for the present and future 
firm performance (Harymawan & Nasih & Ratri & Nowland 2019, 1-9).  
A CEO is capable of steering a company towards successful financial years, ensuring a high 
reputation of the firm in the business world. However, there is also a downside of bearing 
all the responsibility for a company. Even if the CEO’s abilities have contributed to the 
success of the company, external economic factors can influence the firm’s operations 
negatively and the CEO is still hold accountable for the failure.   
No two Chief Executive Officers are alike and Shen (2019, 1-25) confirms this fact by stating 
that CEOs have diverse background and demographic characteristics that might result in a 
different strategic decision-making approach that, in turn, could affect the firm performance. 
A CEO’s characteristics might provide important information for stakeholders and allow 
them to evaluate whether investing in the company, for instance, would be of value. It is 
important to mention that by CEO characteristics, one does not mean the general character 
attributes that define every person individually, but rather the CEO’s gender, origin, 
education, age, experience and busyness. 
As mentioned before, a CEO’s characteristics might affect the firm performance positively 
or negatively. However, it is not possible to generally state that there is a relationship 
between a CEO’s characteristics and the firm performance. Different characteristics, firm 
performance indicators and other factors, such as the country where the firm operates in, 
have to be taken into account in order to be able to examine whether there is a relationship. 
1.1 Purpose 
Various studies have already examined the relationship between certain CEO characteristics 
and the firm performance in the United States of America. One of these studies, which is the 
foundation for the theoretical and empirical part of this bachelor’s thesis, reports a 
relationship between a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive busyness 
and the firm performance in the U.S. It is, however, not apparent how strong the impact of 
the mentioned CEO characteristics on the firm’s performance truly is and how much 
importance one should eventually attach to the reported relationship. The purpose of this 
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bachelor’s thesis is therefore to examine how strongly a CEO’s executive age, executive 
experience and executive busyness impacts the performance of U.S.-American firms. The 
impact and how strong it truly is, will be assessed by analyzing one specific study, which 
reports a relationship between a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive 
busyness and the firm performance in the U.S. and by conducting the empirical part. 
Additionally, this thesis should provide insights on whether one specific stakeholder group, 
namely the investors, should attach importance to the executive age, executive experience 
and executive busyness of the current CEO when evaluating an investment option or whether 
they should disregard the characteristics and the reported relationship. Furthermore, the 
thesis should provide information on the three chosen CEO characteristics and on possible 
firm performance measurements, namely profitability and investment ratios as well as other 
performance ratios.  
1.2 Research questions 
The bachelor’s thesis deals with three research questions that are to be thoroughly discussed 
in the theoretical and empirical part.  
The main research question is: 
1. How strong is the impact of a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and 
executive busyness on the firm performance in the United States? 
The main research question will be answered by incorporating one particular study and 
analyzing its findings regarding the existing relationship. It is necessary to first analyze the 
relationship between the chosen CEO characteristics and firm performance in the U.S., 
before being able to examine how strong the impact is. The empirical part should contribute 
to the clarification of the main research question. If the empirical part provides other results 
than the study, the reasons for the deviating results should be discussed. To answer the main 
research question, the findings from both the study and the empirical part will be used.  
The two other research questions are sub-questions that provide important information for 
answering the main research question: 
2. What is meant by the executive age, executive experience and executive busyness of 
a CEO? 
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This research question should provide general information on the three mentioned 
characteristics, so that a foundation is laid to later understand the relationship and the impact 
of these characteristics on firm performance and to be able to follow the empirical part. 
3. What is meant by firm performance and how can it be measured? 
Since this bachelor’s thesis is examining how strong the influence of certain CEO 
characteristics on firm performance truly is, it is essential to explain the term “firm 
performance” in the first place. Furthermore, possible firm performance measurements 
should be introduced and explained. The firm performance indicators for this thesis are 
Tobin’s Q (investment ratio), ROA (Return on Assets, profitability ratio) as well as Leverage 
and Sales Growth (other performance ratios). Tobin’s Q and ROA are the main performance 
indicators, whereas Leverage and Sales Growth play a subordinate role. Tobin’s Q and ROA 
are used as dependent variables in the academic study that examines the relationship between 
CEO characteristics and firm performance, i.e. Tobin’s Q and ROA represent firm 
performance. Leverage and Sales Growth influence Tobin’s Q and/or ROA and are used as 
control variables, i.e. they influence firm performance, but they do not represent firm 
performance. 
1.3 Framework 
The three chosen CEO characteristics, the three firm performance measurement categories 
and the analysis of the relationship and the impact of the three characteristics on firm 
performance make up the theoretical framework for this bachelor’s thesis. This information, 
classified as secondary data, was gathered from online articles in scientific journals, 
scientific studies, websites that deal with financial and economic issues, encyclopedias and 
one master’s thesis. The mentioned sources were primarily used to deal with the CEO 
characteristics and firm performance measurement categories since these provide 
trustworthy, but more general information for answering the two sub-questions. The 
relationship and the impact, on the other hand, were analyzed by using solely one particular 
study. The analysis of the relationship and the impact of the chosen characteristics on the 
firm performance indicators are at the same time the scientific and theoretical answer of the 
main research question and the foundation for the empirical part. It was important to focus 
on only one study and its examination of the relationship and impact since it allows one to 
analyze the findings in depth. Incorporating several studies would have led to a more general 
analysis of the relationship and the impact as every study has its own main focus and 
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approach. Moreover, the findings of the chosen study were used to conduct the empirical 
part, which would not have been possible with various findings of different studies.  
The empirical part was conducted to test how strong the impact of the chosen CEO 
characteristics on firm performance truly is. The test consisted of four U.S.-American S&P 
500 companies and their current CEOs. Information about the company’s business activities 
and its CEO were taken from the financial websites Forbes and Reuters as well as Bloomberg 
and the homepages of the companies. The firm performance indicators were calculated and 
analyzed by using the financial information from the company’s annual reports. Annual 
reports are published by the company itself and approved by an external auditor, which 
ensures the highest possible reliability of these numbers. If unusual developments in 
financial numbers could not be explained with the information of the annual reports, online 
articles, either published by the company itself or by acknowledged business news providers, 
were incorporated. The information for the empirical part can only be classified as secondary 
data. It was not possible to provide primary data since American CEOs have a very high 
rank in the business world, which makes it impossible to conduct an interview, for instance.   
1.4 Goals 
The main goal of this bachelor’s thesis is to find out how strongly a CEO’s executive age, 
executive experience and executive busyness truly impacts the performance of U.S.-
American companies. Moreover, this thesis should state whether investors should keep the 
findings regarding the relationship in mind when evaluating a firm and its performance. 
When it comes to the empirical part, it is interesting to see if the knowledge from the 
theoretical part can be applied in such a way that the empirical result confirms the stated 
theory.  
1.5 Limitations 
As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to examine the relationship of a CEO’s characteristics 
and firm performance without including other factors, like the country where the company 
is operating in. To be able to examine the relationship and how strong the impact of certain 
CEO characteristics on firm performance is, this thesis will only focus on the United States 
of America. Regarding the theoretical part, only the three CEO characteristics executive age, 
executive experience and executive busyness will be introduced. There are studies that have 
analyzed the relationship between these characteristics and firm performance and that 
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provide the statistical prove necessary for answering the main research question and 
conducting the empirical part. Nevertheless, for answering the main research question, only 
one S&P 500 study will be used to explain what the theory suggests regarding the impact of 
the chosen CEO characteristics on firm performance. The S&P 500 study, that can be applied 
for the United States, uses Tobin’s Q and ROA as the firm performance indicators as well 
as Sales Growth and Leverage as control ratios. This thesis will therefore focus on only these 
ratios when it comes to firm performance and the empirical part.  
The empirical part will test how strong the proposed impact on firm performance truly is by 
using a certain amount and type of American companies, namely four S&P 500 companies. 
Since there is no possibility to interview American CEOs, the information for conducting 
the empirical part will only be taken from the companies’ homepages, annual reports, online 
business news and financial websites. Annual reports for fiscal 2019 that are published after 
12.03.2020 will not be taken into consideration anymore.  
Eventually, how strong the impact of the chosen CEO characteristics on firm performance 
truly is, will solely be assessed by using the information provided in the theoretical and 
empirical part. 
2 CEO characteristics  
The Chief Executive Officer, being the person with the highest rank in a business company, 
is responsible for all tasks that cannot be delegated to other employees. The execution of 
these tasks requires a broader knowledge and a willingness to bear the responsibility for the 
outcome and is therefore reserved for the CEO. These tasks include making corporate 
decisions, such as setting a strategy that needs to be followed, modelling and setting the 
firm’s culture, appointing and leading the senior executive team and managing the operations 
and resources of the company. It is crucial for an organization to choose a person that is truly 
capable of managing the mentioned tasks, because the CEO’s actions will indisputably have 
a positive or negative impact on the firm’s present and future operations. Therefore, 
appointing a CEO that is able to fulfill the tasks is an essential decision that has to be 
thoroughly thought through by the organization. The organization can approach this decision 
by analyzing the skills, characteristics and background of the CEO and assessing whether 
they match the company’s background and the expectations regarding the skills and 
characteristics (Diks, 2016, 1-31). It is important to examine not only the skills, but also 
particular characteristics that go along with the Chief Executive Officer, e.g. age, tenure and 
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gender since they can have an influence on the company’s success as well. Analyzing a 
CEO’s skills and characteristics is not only important for organizations who wish to appoint 
a new CEO, but also for investors who think of financing the company. 
 
This bachelor’s thesis focuses on three chosen CEO characteristics – executive age, 
executive experience and executive busyness – and the following paragraphs will introduce 
them by explaining how they can influence a CEO’s behavior and what it can mean for 
possible investors. There are other characteristics that can be taken into consideration, 
however, the chosen study that provides statistically proven information for answering the 
main research question of this thesis, examines the influence of these three characteristics 
on firm performance. Whether a negative or positive influence on the firm performance 
indicators is given by the mentioned characteristics will be discussed in the fourth chapter. 
2.1 Executive age  
The executive age is defined as the length of time that a CEO has lived (Peni 2014, 185-
205). Younger and older CEOs are both common in the business world, however, U.S.-
American companies that are listed in the Fortune 500 and S&P 500, hire CEOs with an 
average executive age of 57, as of 2019. Compared to 2005, where the average executive 
age was 46, U.S.-American companies tend to hire older CEOs nowadays (Business Insider, 
2019).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average CEO age at hire (Business Insider, 2019) 
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Younger and older CEOs have different views that influence their decision-making process 
in business life, and it is therefore important to have a closer look at both younger and older 
Chief Executive Officers.  
2.1.1 Older CEOs 
Older CEOs had enough time to accumulate wealth during their previous careers that might 
serve as an extra pension for future years. The protection of this wealth could therefore be 
very important, and the strategic decisions and actions taken should not diminish the 
accumulated wealth in any way. Therefore, older CEOs tend to take limited strategic actions, 
resulting in staying committed to the status quo and avoiding additional risk. Larger 
acquisitions and Research and Development expenditures can go along with a higher risk 
and might therefore be unfavorable as well. Moreover, their cognitive schema has had more 
time to consolidate, which means that older Chief Executive Officers might be less willing 
or able to learn and integrate new information (Wang & Holmes JR. & Oh & Zhu 2016, 775-
862). Cognitive schemata are models, created by people, that serve as efficient templates to 
filter new information on a person’s individual way through life. This new information 
becomes part of the existing model and can lead to a modified one (Schmidt & Willis 2007). 
For older CEOs, the existing model might be strongly consolidated, meaning that including 
new information and in that way modifying the model, is hardly possible. Furthermore, the 
introduction of new technologies becomes more unlikely, the older the CEO is, confirming 
the fact that flexibility decreases while resistance to change increases as people age. In 
addition, older Chief Executive Officers tend to keep their upcoming retirement in mind, 
which means that short-term projects are preferred, even if long-term projects would create 
more value for shareholders. Eventually, advertisement and capital expenditures tend to 
decrease in the final years of a CEO (Nguyen & Rahman & Zhao 2018, 133-151).  
2.1.2 Younger CEOs 
By contrast, younger CEOs have had little time to accumulate wealth during their previous 
careers. In order to change this circumstance, these CEOs might introduce aggressive 
strategic actions to achieve high financial returns not only for the business, but also for them 
as individuals. Influenced by the prospect of financial returns, younger CEOs are more 
willing to take higher risks, e.g. higher investments in Research and Development or the 
acquisition of other companies, sometimes overestimating their experiences and 
underestimating the impact of taking a higher risk. Regarding the cognitive schemata, their 
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models to filter new information are usually not consolidated and well-developed yet, 
meaning that it is easier for younger CEOs to learn and include new information quickly. As 
a result, they tend to assess investments faster than older CEOs and ensure that further 
actions are taken timely if the investment is profitable. Besides, they are more likely to 
initiate a change in the organization, thus defining a new status quo (Wang & Holmes JR. & 
Oh & Zhu 2016, 775-862). They open and close new plants more frequently and use market 
entry strategies that are riskier, such as the greenfield strategy, instead of opting for 
cooperation, like joint ventures (Belenzon & Shamshur & Zarutskie 2019, 917-944).  
In conclusion, it is recommendable to consider the executive age when thinking of investing 
in a company. Lenders have to be certain about what they wish to achieve with their 
investment activity. Choosing a company with a younger CEO might go along with higher 
returns that are, however, linked to higher risks. Investing in companies with older CEOs, 
on the other hand, might guarantee lower returns at a more secure level.  
2.2 Executive experience 
The executive experience is defined as the number of years the current CEO of the company 
has served in that position (Peni 2014, 185-205). In this thesis, the executive experience is 
equal to CEO tenure and both terms will be used as synonyms for each other. As of 2017, 
the average CEO tenure at S&P 500 companies amounted to 7.2 years, showing a slight 
decrease when compared to 2013 (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 
2018). There are currently no available numbers for 2019, however, the stable numbers of 
the last years lead to the assumption that CEO tenure in 2019 amounted to about 7 years as 
well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: CEO tenure at S&P 500 companies (Harvard Law School Forum 
on Corporate Governance, 2018) 
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When talking about a CEO’s executive experience, it is important to distinguish whether it 
is a longer-tenured CEO or not. Longer-tenured CEOs and CEOs in their early tenure have 
different views that influence their decision-making process in business life, and it is again 
important to have a closer look at both CEO types. 
2.2.1 Longer-tenured CEOs 
CEOs with more executive experience pursue the same goal as older CEOs, they usually 
want to protect their accumulated wealth in any way since this wealth might serve as an extra 
pension for future years. Therefore, longer-tenured CEOs tend to be less willing to make 
risky investments and to initiate new strategies that might harm the firm’s operations and in 
turn their legacy. Furthermore, more experienced Chief Executive Officers have had more 
time to gain power, knowledge and skills, helping them to better cope with shareholder’s 
pressure, for instance. Besides, they have had more opportunities to nominate board 
members with the same visions and goals, ensuring that both the CEO and the board pull 
together. The board, also called the board of directors, is legally present at every public 
company and can be found in non-profit organizations and private companies as well. The 
board is a panel of people who represent shareholders and they are responsible, among other 
things, for creating dividend and options policies, maintaining company resources and hiring 
and firing the Chief Executive Officer (Corporate Finance Institute, w.y.). So, the longer the 
CEO is present in his position, the less stakeholders can put the CEO under pressure (Wang 
& Holmes JR. & Oh & Zhu 2016, 775-862).  
2.2.2 CEOs in their early tenure 
Chief Executive Officers with less executive experience tend to take higher risks. At the 
beginning of their tenure, CEOs are at a higher risk of dismissal and they try to demonstrate 
their skills by making major changes, e.g. changing the company’s scope or implementing a 
new strategy. Through implementing riskier changes, they have the opportunity to exert their 
power, prove their skills and establish their authority. Unlike more experienced CEOs, these 
CEOs have no allies in the board of directors, which means that they should start to establish 
a relationship by asking the board members for advice or even mentoring (Wang & Holmes 
JR. & Oh & Zhu 2016, 775-862). Eventually, Bragaw and Misangyi (2015, 243-265) add 
that CEOs establish a certain “worldview” and a “repertoire of skills” in the early years of 
their tenure. Their learning process starts with becoming acquainted with the company and 
industry and decreases over time as they become more familiar with the daily business. 
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To summarize, longer-tenured CEOs make less riskier decisions, which ensures that the 
firm’s success and the investor’s money is not threatened. However, investors should keep 
in mind that longer-tenured CEOs tend to be more resistant against shareholder’s pressure. 
It is therefore worth considering whether investing in a less-experienced CEO is the better 
option to go with. 
2.3 Executive busyness 
The executive busyness of a CEO can be measured through CEO duality. CEO duality means 
that the same person holds the CEO and Chairperson position in a company (Peni 2014, 185-
205). The Chairperson is part of the board of directors and is in a higher position than the 
CEO. Without the approval of the board, the CEO is not able to make major decisions on his 
own (Corporate Finance Institute, w.y.). According to The Economist (2019), CEO duality 
amounted to approximately 40% in 2019, which is a major decrease compared to 2001. 
Nevertheless, almost half of S&P 500 companies allow CEOs to hold the Chairperson 
position as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of CEO duality can be approached through two different 
theories, namely agency and stewardship theory.  
Figure 3: CEO duality at S&P 500 companies (The Economist, 2019) 
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2.3.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory describes the relationship between the agent and the principal. The agent is 
defined as being self-interested, boundedly rational and different from principals in his goals 
and risk-taking preferences (Payne & Petrenko, 2019). When applying the agency theory to 
CEO duality, the CEO has the role of the agent, whereas the owners, represented by the 
board of directors, are the principals. The agent is defined as being self-interested, which 
means that the goals and interests of the CEO may differ from the interests of the owners. It 
is therefore necessary for the board of directors to control and monitor the CEO closely in 
order to be able to align the CEO’s and owner’s goals. However, when the CEO is also the 
Chairperson of the Board, the controlling and monitoring role is constrained. The board is 
then in a less powerful position relative to that of the CEO, even though the board of directors 
should be superior to the Chief Executive Officer (Wang & Sun & Yu & Zhang 2014, 94-
101). The agency theory clearly states that CEO duality diminishes the power of the board 
of directors and hinders the alignment of both interests and is therefore disadvantageous for 
the shareholders.  
2.3.2 Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory argues “that people are intrinsically motivated to work for others or for 
organizations to accomplish the tasks and responsibilities with which they have been 
entrusted”. Moreover, “people are collective minded and pro-organizational rather than 
individualistic and therefore work toward the attainment of organizational, group, or societal 
goals because doing so gives them a higher level of satisfaction.” (Menyah, 2013). In this 
theory, the CEO is the steward and is intrinsically motivated to work for the organization 
and to accomplish tasks in the interest of the firm and the shareholders. Monitoring and 
controlling leads to less CEO motivation, therefore giving more authority is the right 
approach in this case (Wang & Sun & Yu & Zhang 2014, 94-101). CEO duality ensures 
more authority and leads to an even higher motivation to act in accordance with the owner’s 
interests and goals. Aligning these goals gives the CEO a higher level of satisfaction and 
motivates him to further work on satisfying the firm and the shareholders. By contrast to the 
agency theory, the stewardship theory clearly states that CEO duality ensures that the Chief 
Executive Officer is not only working in his interest, but also in the interest of the owners.  
In order to be able to say whether CEO duality is advantageous or disadvantageous for 
possible investors, it is important to know how they perceive CEO duality. Since almost 50, 
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of S&P 500 companies combine the role of the CEO and the Chairperson, it leads to the 
assumption that at least organizations perceive CEO duality as advantageous.  
3 Firm performance 
The previous chapter provided information on the executive age, executive experience and 
executive busyness of a CEO and is supposed to give a better understanding of the CEO 
characteristics that this bachelor’s thesis focuses on. However, the definition of the 
characteristics is only the first step in being able to answer the main research question. It is 
still necessary to have a closer look at firm performance and to specify clearly how firm 
performance is measured in this academic work. This bachelor’s thesis analyzes the results 
of a previous study that has already examined the relationship between CEO characteristics 
and firm performance and uses the same firm performance indicators, namely Tobin’s Q 
(investment ratio) and ROA (Return on Assets, profitability ratio). It is necessary to 
introduce and focus on exactly these ratios since the statistical findings of the academic study 
will be the foundation for dealing with the main research question and for conducting the 
empirical part. Tobin’s Q and ROA serve as dependent variables in the statistical analysis, 
which means that these ratios measure firm performance. However, Tobin’s Q and ROA 
might not only be influenced by certain CEO characteristics, but also by other ratios that 
serve as control variables. The established control variables in the academic study and this 
bachelor’s thesis are Leverage and Sales Growth (other performance ratios). Whether and 
what impact the control variables have on firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA), should 
also be discussed in this chapter.  
 
In general, this chapter should provide information on firm performance, so that the reader 
is able to establish a basic understanding of this term. Furthermore, the dependent variables 
– Tobin’s Q and ROA – should be introduced in greater detail, including a general 
explanation, a formula and a definition of a good and poor level. The same approach is valid 
for the control variables Leverage and Sales Growth, whereby the impact of the control 
variables on the dependent variables should be explained in more detail. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide sufficient information for the reader to be able to understand what firm 
performance is and how it can be measured.  
 13 
3.1 Definition 
The absence of an operational definition for firm performance leads to the circumstance that 
the term firm performance can be defined differently. People that deal with this issue have 
come up with definitions that are general, abstract, less or clearly defined, depending on the 
personal interpretations. So, when talking about firm performance, there is no right or wrong 
and there are various definitions that have been determined during the last decades. This 
paragraph should introduce some of them, so that the reader has a general idea of firm 
performance in the end.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, Yuchtman and Seashore defined firm performance as “an 
organization’s ability to exploit its environment for accessing and using the limited 
resources”. In 1986, Porter put the focus more on the customers of the firm, stating that firm 
performance depends on its ability to create value for its clients. In 1994, Adam approached 
firm performance very differently to his predecessors, saying that organizational 
performance is deeply dependent on the employee’s performance quality. In his eyes, a good 
firm performance could only be achieved by giving the employees up-to-date knowledge 
and skills, which ensures that the employees keep pace with the market’s changes. Harrison 
and Freeman (1999) defined a good level of firm performance as keeping the stakeholders 
(e.g. investors, employees and customers) satisfied. In 2009, Colase made organizational 
performance dependent on growth, profitability and return and Bartoli and Blatrix expanded 
the definition in 2015 by adding items like efficiency, effectiveness and quality (Taouab & 
Issor 2019, 93-106).  
Looking at the different definitions, it becomes clear that firm performance cannot be 
defined generally since it strongly depends on personal perceptions and interpretations. 
Nevertheless, the chosen measurement of firm performance in this bachelor’s thesis 
corresponds best with Colase’s definition. Therefore, in this thesis firm performance is 
defined as growth, profitability and return.  
3.2 Measurements 
After looking at various definitions, it is important to explain how external parties, including 
investors, can measure an organization’s performance. This paragraph introduces some 
models that are used to measure firm performance and specifies how the performance is 
measured in this bachelor’s thesis.  
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According to Taouab and Issor (2019, 93-106), the most important reason why to measure 
firm performance is to evaluate whether the organizational strategy is followed. Comparing 
the performance over different periods allows various stakeholders to see whether a progress 
has been made or whether changes have to be implemented within the organization. 
Moreover, the measurement might offer important invaluable information, which allows to 
monitor performance, report progress, improve motivation and communication, and pinpoint 
problems. There are different common models how to measure firm performance, including 
Balanced Scorecard, Performance Prism, Malcolm Bridge Model and Performance Pyramid 
(Taouab & Issor 2019, 93-106). Even though these models are common firm performance 
measurements, firm performance will be measured differently in this thesis. 
  
In this bachelor’s thesis, firm performance is defined as Tobin’s Q (investment ratio) and 
ROA (Return on Assets, profitability ratio). Investment ratios reflect the shareholder’s 
expectations concerning the future performance (Al-Matari & Al-Swidi & Fadzil 2014, 24-
49), whereas profitability ratios measure a company’s ability to generate income relative to 
revenue, balance sheet assets, operating costs, and equity (Corporate Finance Institute, w.y.). 
In this thesis, it is necessary to use Tobin’s Q and ROA for measuring firm performance, 
because the academic study that has examined the relationship between the chosen CEO 
characteristics and firm performance has based its statistical findings on these ratios. 
Moreover, Tobin’s Q and ROA serve as dependent variables in the statistical analysis and 
will therefore be categorized as these in this bachelor’s thesis. In order to be able to deliver 
statistically proven results, it is important to use other ratios as well, because Tobin’s Q and 
ROA might not only be influenced by certain CEO characteristics. These other ratios, 
defined as other performance indicators, are Leverage and Sales Growth and are categorized 
as control variables. 
In summary, Tobin’s Q (investment ratio) and ROA (profitability ratio), categorized as 
dependent variables, represent firm performance. Leverage and Sales Growth (other 
performance indicators) are categorized as control variables, i.e. they might have an impact 
on firm performance, but they do not represent firm performance.  
3.3 Importance 
After defining firm performance and introducing possible measurements, it might be 
beneficial to explain why one specific stakeholder group, namely the investors, should keep 
track of the company’s performance.  
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Measuring the performance allows investors to see whether the company’s business is 
successful, especially when tracking the performance over a certain period of time. A 
successful business will satisfy existing stakeholders and offer attractive financial returns 
for new ones. Moreover, a good firm performance shows that the processes within the 
company are running smoothly, whereas a lower firm performance might indicate that 
changes have to be made. All in one, measuring the performance allows investors to see 
whether the company’s operations steer the company towards successful financial years and 
whether satisfying financial returns can be expected in turn.  
3.4 Dependent variables 
A dependent variable is a variable that changes depending on one or several independent 
variables. It is also called the endogenous variable, because it demonstrates a reaction to 
changes in the independent variable (Statista, w.y.). In this case, Tobin’s Q and ROA might 
be affected by a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive busyness that 
serve as independent variables.  
3.4.1 Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q or the Q Ratio compares the market value of a company to the replacement cost 
of its assets. The market value is equal to the market value of equity and is explained in the 
next paragraph. The replacement cost, or replacement value, is the cost of replacing an 
existing asset based on its current market price. However, estimating the replacement cost 
of an asset can be quite difficult, that is why the book value of total assets is used instead.   
Tobin’s Q is used to estimate whether a given business or market is overvalued or 
undervalued. A low Q (between 0 and 1) means that the stock is undervalued, whereas a 
high Q (greater than 1) means that the stock is overvalued (Hayes, 2019). Especially for 
investors it is important to know whether a stock is under- or overvalued. An undervalued 
stock sells for less than it is worth, indicating that the price is more likely to rise over time. 
In other words, investors can buy the stock for a low price and sell it for a higher price in the 
end, thus making a profit. Vice versa, overvalued stocks sell for more than they are worth. 
This could mean that investors buy the stock for a high price and sell it for a lower price in 
the end, thus making a loss (Burch, 2019). There is no clear statement on what is considered 
to be a good or poor Tobin’s Q, however, in this bachelor’s thesis, an increase in Tobin’s Q 
is perceived as positive.  
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The formula for calculating Tobin’s Q is provided by Peni (2014, 185-205) and is as follows: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Market value of equity 
The market value of equity, also known as market capitalization, represents how much 
investors think a company is worth today. Since the two input variables share price and 
shares outstanding can change daily, the market value of equity can change throughout the 
trading day (Chen, 2019).  
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 
Book value of debt  
The book value of debt represents a certain amount of debt that is recorded in the books 
(balance sheet) of the company (WallStreetMojo, w.y.).  
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
Book value of preferred stock 
The book value of preferred stock represents the amount a company would pay out per share 
if it decides to sell off its assets (Keythman, w.y.).  
𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 
Book value of total assets  
The book value of total assets represents the total amount of assets that is recorded in the 
books (balance sheet) of the company.  
3.4.2 Return on Assets  
ROA, Return on Assets, is a profitability ratio that indicates how profitable a company is 
relative to its total assets. By using this ratio, managers and investors can assess how efficient 
an organization is using its assets to generate earnings.  
Since ROA is highly dependent on the industry, it is important to compare the numbers 
against previous ones or against the numbers of a similar company. It is difficult to state 
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what a good or poor level of ROA is, however, the higher the ratio is the more efficient the 
company is using its assets (Hargrave, 2019). 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Net income 
Net income, also called net earnings, shows how much is left after conducting the cost of 
goods sold (COGS), selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A), operating 
expenses, depreciation, interest, taxes, and other expenses from sales. This number can be 
found on a company’s income statement and is, such as ROA, an indicator of a company’s 
profitability (Kenton, 2020).  
Total assets 
Total assets are the sum of current and non-current assets and equal the sum of liabilities and 
shareholder’s equity.  
3.5 Control variables 
A control variable is a variable that is not of primary interest and is used as a third factor 
whose influence is to be controlled (Salkind, 2010). In this case, Leverage and Sales Growth 
serve as control variables, they are not of primary interest since they do not measure firm 
performance, however, it is important to control their influence on Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
3.5.1 Leverage 
In this bachelor’s thesis, Leverage (amount of debt a firm uses to finance assets (Hayes, 
2019)) is defined as the debt to asset ratio. This ratio shows the percentage of assets that are 
financed with debt. It is used by creditors to determine the amount of debt in a company and 
the company’s ability to repay the debt. Moreover, investors can use this ratio to make sure 
that the company is solvent and is able to meet current and future obligations (Corporate 
Finance Institute, w.y.). 
It is difficult to state what a good or poor level of Leverage is, however, the higher the ratio, 
the greater the degree of leverage and financial risk. A ratio of 0.6 for instance means that 
60% of the company’s assets are financed by creditors and the remaining 40% are financed 
with equity. 
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𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Since Leverage serves as a control variable, it is important to show whether it has an 
influence on Tobin’s Q and/or ROA. In order to be able to show this influence, the statistical 
findings of Emilia Peni (2014, 185-205) will be presented. The study of Emilia Peni will be 
introduced in the next chapter as her findings are used to answer the main research question 
of this bachelor’s thesis. Therefore, in this chapter, only the two tables showing the impact 
of Leverage and Sales Growth on Tobin’s Q and/or ROA will be discussed.  
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 1 
ROA 
Model 2 
Q 
Model 3 
ROA 
Model 4 
 
Leverage 
 
0.021 - 0.156*** 0.155 - 0.149*** 
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 5 
ROA 
Model 6 
Q 
Model 7 
ROA 
Model 8 
 
Leverage 
 
0.026 - 0.154*** 0.164 - 0.150*** 
 
Table 1: Impact Leverage on Tobin's Q and ROA (Peni, 2014) 
In order to be able to understand the influence, it is necessary to explain what “***” means in 
a statistical sense. In this case, “***” indicates a significance at the 0.01 level, which means 
that the finding has a 99% chance of being true or a 1% chance of not being true. “**” 
indicates a significance at the 0.05 level and “*” indicates a significance at the 0.10 level.  
Table 1 clearly states that Leverage has no impact on Tobin’s Q since the significance 
indicator is missing. However, Leverage has in all four models (Model 2, 4, 6 and 8) an 
impact on ROA, indicated by a significance at the 0.01 level. Moreover, it has a negative 
impact, meaning that the higher the debt to asset ratio is, the lower ROA gets. Conversely, 
the lower the debt to asset ratio is, the higher ROA gets.  
3.5.2 Sales Growth  
Sales Growth is the percent growth in the net sales of a company from one period to another. 
Looking at the Sales Growth rate can tell an investor whether the sales numbers rose between 
two periods and by how much. Analyzing the growth rate can inform an investor about the 
company’s financial performance and the business’ profitability. Moreover, a high 
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percentage of sales growth might indicate that the economy is doing well, because 
consumers are willing to spend their money (Reddigari, 2019). There is no good or bad level 
for Sales Growth, but it is of course considered as good if sales numbers have risen over the 
last period. 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 − 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 × 100 
 
As for Leverage, the statistical findings of Emilia Peni (2014, 185-205) will be presented to 
assess whether Sales Growth has an impact on Tobin’s Q and/or ROA.  
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 1 
ROA 
Model 2 
Q 
Model 3 
ROA 
Model 4 
 
Sales Growth 
 
0.022*** 0.002*** 0.020*** 0.002** 
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 5 
ROA 
Model 6 
Q 
Model 7 
ROA 
Model 8 
 
Sales Growth 
 
0.022*** 0.002*** 0.020*** 0.002** 
 
Table 2: Impact Sales Growth on Tobin's Q and ROA (Peni, 2014) 
Table 2 clearly states that Sales Growth has both a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Sales Growth has in all four models an impact on Tobin’s Q, indicated by a significance at 
the 0.01 level. However, Sales Growth has in two models (Model 2 and Model 6) an impact 
on ROA, indicated by a significance at the 0.01 level, whereas it has in Model 4 and Model 
8 only a significance at the 0.05 level. Therefore, it is more probable that Sales Growth has 
a positive impact on Tobin’s Q than on ROA, meaning that Tobin’s Q increases due to a 
growth in sales.  
The findings regarding the influence of Leverage and Sales Growth on Tobin’s Q and ROA 
will be important in the next chapter and the empirical part and only serve as an introduction 
in this chapter.  
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4 CEO characteristics and firm performance  
The aim of this chapter is to answer the main research question from a theoretical point of 
view. In order to be able to find an answer for the question, this bachelor’s thesis introduces 
and analyzes the statistical findings of one specific study that reports a relationship. In order 
to be able to assess how strong the impact of the chosen characteristics is, it is important to 
first introduce and analyze a study that reports a relationship. Without analyzing a study that 
statistically confirms a relationship, it is not possible to assess the impact from a theoretical 
and empirical point of view. There are various other studies that have examined the impact 
of certain CEO qualities on a firm’s performance, however, the chosen study fulfills certain 
requirements that are necessary to answer the research question and to conduct the empirical 
part. This bachelor’s thesis requires a study that deals with the three chosen CEO 
characteristics and that reports a relationship between these characteristics and firm 
performance in the United States of America.  
 
The chosen study “CEO and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance”, conducted 
by Emilia Peni (2014, 185-205), focuses on the relationship between Chief Executive Officer 
and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance. This study takes also Chairperson 
characteristics into consideration, however, since this thesis is only focusing on the Chief 
Executive Officer, the findings regarding the Chairperson will be neglected. The introduced 
characteristics are executive gender, executive age, executive experience, executive 
busyness and executive quality. Furthermore, Tobin’s Q and ROA are defined as the firm 
performance indicators, and this is why the previous chapter has defined firm performance 
in exactly the same way. Moreover, Peni uses a sample of 305 S&P 500 firms in order to 
examine the relationship. The sample period extends from 2006 to 2010 and amounts to 
1,525 firm-year observations. The S&P 500 (Standard & Poor’s 500) is a market-
capitalization (market cap) weighted index of the 500 largest U.S.-American publicly traded 
companies (Kenton, 2019). Publicly traded companies are corporations whose shares are 
traded on stock exchanges or over-the-counter markets and that is why the ownership of 
these corporations is distributed amongst general public shareholders (Banton, 2019). 
Companies included in the S&P 500 index represent the leading industries of the American 
economy and are part of this index because of their market size and liquidity (Kenton, 2019). 
Successful companies that are listed in the S&P 500 index are for instance Apple, Microsoft 
and Amazon. 
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The S&P 500 index considers companies with non-American headquarters as well, which 
might mean that Peni examines the relationship between a CEO’s characteristics and firm 
performance not only in the United States. If this would be the case, it would not be possible 
to assess how strong the impact of the chosen CEO characteristics on the performance of 
firms operating within the United States is. However, Peni states in her limitations that her 
results might not be applicable to firms operating outside the USA, which indicates that she 
primarily focuses on the United States.  
 
After a brief introduction of Peni’s study, it is important to understand why this study is used 
to answer the main research question from a theoretical point of view. First of all, Peni 
focuses, amongst others, on a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive 
busyness, just as this bachelor’s thesis. Secondly, she uses a sample of S&P 500 companies, 
which means that she examines the relationship and the impact in the United States. 
Eventually, the empirical part should also contribute to the clarification of the main research 
question and Peni’s statistical findings deliver the necessary foundation to conduct the 
empirical part.  
4.1 Statistical findings 
In order to assess how strong the impact on firm performance is, it is necessary to examine 
whether a relationship between the chosen CEO characteristics and firm performance can be 
seen altogether. To examine the relationship, it is necessary to conduct several steps 
beforehand. Emilia Peni (2014, 185-205) has conducted a cross-sectional panel regression, 
which is a statistical method used to examine the relationship. Since this bachelor’s thesis is 
only answering how strong the impact of the chosen CEO characteristics on the performance 
of U.S.-American companies is, it is sufficient to present and explain Peni’s findings. 
Therefore, no explanations regarding Peni’s used methodology will be delivered. 
  
The following chapters will answer why Peni states that a relationship between a CEO’s 
executive age, executive experience and executive busyness and firm performance in the 
United States can be seen and how strong the impact is. The results are based on the 305 
S&P 500 companies, which represent the United States. 
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4.1.1 Executive age and firm performance 
In Peni’s study, executive age is called CEOAGE. 
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 1 
ROA 
Model 2 
Q 
Model 3 
ROA 
Model 4 
 
Executive age 
 
-0.003 0.001*** - - 
  
Table 3 clearly states that a CEO’s executive age has no impact on Tobin’s Q since the 
significance factor is missing. However, executive age has an impact on ROA, indicated by 
a significance at the 0.01 level. Moreover, it has a positive impact, meaning that the older 
the CEO is, the higher ROA gets.  
4.1.2 Executive experience and firm performance 
In Peni’s study, executive experience is called CEOEXP.  
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 1 
ROA 
Model 2 
Q 
Model 3 
ROA 
Model 4 
Executive 
experience 
0.006** 0.000 - - 
 
Table 4: Impact executive experience on Tobin's Q and ROA (Peni, 2014) 
Table 4 shows that the executive experience of a CEO has no impact on ROA, but a positive 
impact on Tobin’s Q, indicated by a significance at the 0.05 level. The 0.05 level shows that 
this finding has, compared to the significance level of table 3, only a 95% chance of being 
true. Nevertheless, this finding indicates that longer-tenured CEOs increase the Tobin’s Q 
of their company. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Impact executive age on Tobin's Q and ROA (Peni, 2014) 
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4.1.3 Executive busyness and firm performance 
In Peni’s study, executive busyness is called DUAL.  
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 1 
ROA 
Model 2 
Q 
Model 3 
ROA 
Model 4 
Executive 
busyness 
0.287*** 0.020*** 0.268*** 0.027*** 
Dependent 
variable 
Q 
Model 5 
ROA 
Model 6 
Q 
Model 7 
ROA 
Model 8 
Executive 
busyness 
0.278*** 0.021*** 0.314*** 0.027** 
 
Table 5: Impact executive busyness on Tobin's Q and ROA (Peni, 2014) 
Table 5 clearly states that the executive busyness of a CEO, i.e. the same person holds the 
CEO and Chairperson position in a company, has both a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Executive busyness has in all models an impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA, indicated by 
a significance at the 0.01 level. This finding shows that CEO duality both increases ROA 
and Tobin’s Q.  
4.2 Limitations 
Peni presents some limitations in her study and two of them are also applicable for this 
bachelor’s thesis. First of all, the used sample includes only S&P 500 companies. This means 
that the statistical findings regarding the executive age, executive experience and executive 
busyness are certainly applicable for S&P 500 companies and therefore for the United States. 
However, it might be that these findings are not applicable for smaller companies also 
operating in the United States. Secondly, the study and this thesis focus on only some CEO 
characteristics. There are other executive-specific characteristics that might have an impact 
on firm performance besides the chosen ones (Peni 2014, 185-205).  
4.3 Conclusion 
When looking at the statistical findings, it becomes clear that the theory proposes that the 
chosen CEO characteristics have an impact on Tobin’s Q and/or ROA and consequently on 
firm performance. Moreover, the chosen CEO characteristics have a rather strong impact on 
firm performance since Tobin’s Q and/or ROA increase or decrease as a result. If the chosen 
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CEO characteristics would have a rather weak impact, the firm performance indicators 
would presumably not change. Therefore, the main research question can be answered from 
a theoretical point of view by stating that a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and 
executive busyness has a strong impact on the performance of firms operating within the 
United States. In addition, the findings above also mean that investors should gather 
information about a CEO’s age, experience and busyness before investing in a company. 
Nevertheless, to fully examine how strong the impact of the chosen CEO characteristics on 
firm performance truly is, it is still necessary to conduct the empirical part.  
  
As stated in the limitations, the statistical findings are based on a sample of S&P 500 
companies, which represent the United States. However, when using a sample of companies 
that are not listed in the S&P 500 index, it might be that no significant impact can be 
determined. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that in this case only an impact might 
be seen when analyzing S&P 500 companies.  
In order to complete the theoretical part, an overview of the relationship and the impact on 
firm performance will be provided. Moreover, the defined control variables Leverage, and 
Sales Growth will be incorporated since they have an impact on firm performance as well. 
 
The executive age, defined as the length of time that a CEO has lived, has no impact on 
Tobin’s Q, but a positive impact on ROA. This means that older CEOs have a positive impact 
on ROA, whereas younger CEOs have a negative impact on ROA. To illustrate the 
relationship between the executive age and ROA, a simple example will be used. In 2018, 
company X had a 40-year old CEO and a ROA of 9% at the end of the year. At the beginning 
of 2019, company X hired a new CEO (53 years) and determined a ROA of 13% at the end 
of that year. Since the executive age has a positive and strong impact on ROA, the older 
CEO increased the profitability of the company relative to its assets. However, it might be 
the case that ROA amounted to 7% at the end of 2019, even if the new CEO is older. In this 
case, it is reasonable to use the control variable Leverage and to determine whether the debt 
to asset ratio has increased compared to 2018. Leverage has a negative impact on ROA, 
meaning that a higher debt to asset ratio causes a decline in ROA, even if an older CEO 
would contribute to a higher ROA.  
 
The executive experience, defined as the number of years the current CEO of the company 
has served in that position, has no impact on ROA, but a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. This 
means that longer-tenured CEOs have a positive impact on Tobin’s Q, whereas CEOs in 
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their early tenure have a negative impact on Tobin’s Q. To illustrate the relationship between 
the executive experience and Tobin’s Q, the example of company Y will be used. At the end 
of 2017, company’s Y CEO retired after 4 years in that position. In 2018, a new CEO was 
hired and served 2 years in that position by the end of 2019. In 2017, Tobin’s Q amounted 
to 1.5, which means that the company was a bit overvalued. In 2019, Tobin’s Q amounted 
to 1.3, which means that the company was less overvalued. Since CEOs in their early tenure 
have a negative, but strong impact on Tobin’s Q, the new CEO pushed Q away from the old 
figure. However, it might be the case that Tobin’s Q amounted to 1.6 at the end of 2019, 
even if the current CEO is in his early tenure. In this case, it is reasonable to use the control 
variable Sales Growth and to determine whether sales increased compared to 2017. Sales 
Growth has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q, meaning that Q can increase, even if a CEO in 
his early tenure would cause Q to decrease. 
 
The executive busyness of a CEO, measured through CEO duality, has both a positive impact 
on Tobin’s Q and ROA. This means that combining the role of the CEO and the Chairperson 
is advantageous for the company, just as the stewardship theory proposes in the “CEO 
characteristics” chapter. To illustrate the impact of CEO duality, the example of company Z 
will be used. In 2018, company’s Z CEO was only responsible for the tasks assigned to the 
role of a CEO. To that time, Tobin’s Q and ROA amounted to 1.4 and 12%. At the beginning 
of 2019, the CEO was offered the position of the Chairperson and he accepted. In 2019, 
Tobin’s Q and ROA amounted to 1.6 and 15%. Since CEO duality has a positive and strong 
impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA, both Tobin’s Q and ROA increased. As for executive age 
and executive experience, it might be the case that Tobin’s Q and/or ROA decreased despite 
CEO duality. In this case, it is again reasonable to use the control variables Leverage and/or 
Sales Growth and to check the development of the two figures.    
 
It is important to mention that Tobin’s Q and ROA might not only be influenced by certain 
CEO characteristics and the control variables Leverage and Sales Growth. It is therefore 
necessary to look out for external factors that could have an impact on the firm’s 
performance as well. 
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CEO 
Characteristic 
Firm Performance 
Indicator 
Impact 
Control 
Variable 
Impact 
Executive age ROA positive Leverage negative 
Executive 
experience 
Tobin’s Q positive Sales Growth positive 
Executive 
busyness 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
positive 
Sales Growth 
Leverage 
positive 
negative 
 
Table 6: CEO characteristics and firm performance 
5 Test of relationship  
The empirical part uses the information provided in the theoretical part and examines how 
strong the impact of the chosen CEO characteristics on firm performance truly is. The main 
goal of the empirical part is to see whether the impact on the firm performance indicators is 
as strong as proposed in the theoretical part and whether investors should really keep a 
CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive busyness in mind when it comes 
to evaluating an investment option.  
In order to test the proposed impact, it is important to choose companies that are listed on 
the S&P 500 index. The test is based on the statistical findings of Emilia Peni and since her 
findings are based on a sample of 305 S&P 500 companies, this bachelor’s thesis chooses 
companies from this particular index as well.  
 
In order to conduct this test, four companies within a similar market capitalization range will 
be chosen. As a next step, the current CEO of each company will be introduced, including 
information about the executive age, executive experience and executive busyness. 
Moreover, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Leverage and Sales Growth of each company will be calculated 
and provided. To see whether the chosen CEO characteristics have the same significant 
impact on the firm performance indicators as Emilia Peni suggests, it is necessary to provide 
a comparison between two financial periods. Peni (2014, 185-205) states in her limitations 
that her sample period is limited to five fiscal years, which means that longer-term effects of 
CEO characteristics on firm performance cannot be analyzed based on her statistical 
findings. This means that the two compared financial periods in the empirical part are not 
more than five years apart. One financial period is always the year of the last available annual 
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report, i.e. 2019 or 2018. The firm performance indicators of 2019 or 2018 will therefore be 
compared to the performance indicators of 2014 or 2013. If the current CEO is less than five 
years active in his role, the firm performance indicators of the first full year of the current 
CEO will serve as a comparison. So, if the current CEO was appointed in August 2015, ROA 
and Tobin’s Q of 2019 or 2018 will be compared with ROA and Tobin’s Q of 2016. It is 
reasonable to analyze the financial situation of 2016 instead of 2015, because the firm 
performance indicators of 2015 might be influenced by the characteristics of both the 
previous and the current CEO.  
As known from the statistical findings, the executive age of a CEO has a positive impact on 
ROA. It is obvious that in the chosen sample of this bachelor’s thesis the impact should 
always be positive, as the current CEO is always older in 2019/2018 compared to 2014/2013 
or his first full year in the position. It is also necessary to include the control variable 
Leverage and to check whether Leverage’s development has a positive or negative impact 
on ROA.  
The same approach is valid for the executive experience of the CEO, with the difference that 
the executive experience has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and the control variable is Sales 
Growth.  
When testing the impact of a CEO’s executive busyness on Tobin’s Q and ROA, there are 
two different approaches. Executive busyness was introduced as CEO duality, which means 
that the same person holds the CEO and Chairperson position in a company. If the current 
CEO took over the position of the Chairperson at the end of fiscal 17 for instance, it is 
necessary to look at Tobin’s Q and ROA and to check whether Tobin’s Q and ROA increased 
in fiscal 18 compared to fiscal 17. However, it might be that the impact of executive busyness 
cannot be measured, even if CEO duality is given. This is the case when the CEO took the 
role of the CEO and the Chairperson at the beginning of his tenure. Then, there is no financial 
period without CEO duality that could be compared to a financial period with CEO duality. 
Eventually, the relationship between executive busyness and firm performance can also not 
be measured if CEO duality is not given at all. If the impact of executive busyness cannot 
be measured, the other approach is to check whether the current CEO occupies external 
board seats in other publicly traded companies. According to Peni (2014, 185-205), CEOs 
who are active in the board of directors of other companies, have a negative impact on 
Tobin’s Q.  So, if the impact of CEO duality cannot be measured, this bachelor’s thesis will 
check whether the current CEO has other board responsibilities outside the company and 
assess whether this impacts Tobin’s Q negatively. 
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to interview American CEOs and to get first-hand 
information. Therefore, the required information will be collected through the company’s 
annual reports and homepages, the financial websites Forbes and Reuters and other online 
business news providers. 
The following companies are used to examine how strong the impact of a CEO’s executive 
age, executive experience and executive busyness on the firm performance truly is: 
• Cisco Systems  
• Home Depot 
• Procter & Gamble 
• Johnson & Johnson 
All the chosen companies have their headquarters in the United States of America and are 
therefore suitable for this bachelor’s thesis. 
5.1 Cisco Systems 
Cisco Systems, Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells Internet Protocol based networking 
products and services related to the communications and information technology industry. 
It provides a broad line of products for transporting data, voice, and video within buildings 
and across campuses (Forbes, 2019).  
The current CEO of Cisco Systems is Charles H. Robbins and he is currently 53 years old 
(Reuters, 2020). He took the role of the CEO on July 26, 2015 and was moreover elected 
Chairman of the Board on December 11, 2017 (Cisco, w.y.). To test whether Robbins’ 
executive age and executive experience have an impact on the firm performance indicators, 
the indicators of 2016 and 2019 will be compared to each other. As Robbins was also elected 
Chairman of the Board, it is possible to test the impact of his executive busyness on firm 
performance. In order to do so, ROA and Tobin’s Q of 2018 and 2019 will be compared to 
each other. Since the test is based on Peni’s statistical findings, the impact on the firm 
performance indicators should be as follows: ROA should increase in 2019 compared to 
2016, because of a higher executive age. Tobin’s Q should also increase in 2019 compared 
to 2016, because Robbins is more experienced. Eventually, ROA and Tobin’s Q should 
increase in 2019 compared to 2018, because CEO duality is completely given in 2019. To 
see whether the proposed impact is the case in reality, the figures for 2016, 2018 and 2019 
will now be provided and analyzed. The figures, given in millions, will be taken from the  
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annual reports of 2016, 2018 and 2019 provided by Cisco Systems itself.  
 
 
 
When comparing the ROA of 2016 and 2019, it is obvious that ROA has increased by 3.05 
percentage points. The ROA of 2019 shows that Cisco Systems used its total assets even 
more efficient than in 2016 to generate earnings. ROA was higher in 2019 because of less 
total assets and when comparing the balance sheets of both years, it becomes obvious that 
the decrease in total assets was due to a significant decrease in investments. Investments in 
2016 amounted to $ 58,125 M, whereas the investments in 2019 amounted to only $ 21,663 
M. All the other assets are nearly the same in both years. As discussed in the theoretical part, 
older CEOs tend to take limited strategic actions in order to avoid additional risk. Cutting 
the investments might be one way for Charles Robbins to protect his accumulated wealth 
and to avoid additional risk. Moreover, older CEOs tend to avoid larger acquisitions, and 
this is definitely the case for Cisco Systems and its acquisitions. In 2016, Cisco acquired 
twelve companies in total, whereas the acquisitions in 2019 amounted to five. However, the 
theory also suggests that older CEOs spend less money on Research and Development, 
which is not the case here. In 2016, R&D expenses amounted to 6,296 and in 2019 to 6,577.  
To test whether ROA might have been even higher, it is necessary to provide the calculations 
for Leverage as well. As already known, Leverage has a negative impact on ROA, so the 
higher Leverage is, the lower ROA gets. In the case of Cisco Systems, Leverage slightly 
increased in 2019 compared to 2016, which means that Leverage negatively influenced ROA 
in 2019. It can be assumed that the executive age of Robbins might have had an even stronger 
impact on ROA if Leverage would not have increased.  
In conclusion, it can be assumed that Charles Robbins’ higher executive age has, as proposed 
by Peni, a positive and strong impact on firm performance. 
Cisco Systems, 
Charles H. 
Robbins 
Executive age ROA Leverage 
fiscal 16 49 
$ 10,739  
$ 121,652 
 * 100 = 8.83% 
$ 4,160+24,483
$ 121,652
 * 100 = 23.55% 
fiscal 19 52 
$ 11,621  
$ 97,793  
 * 100 = 11.88% 
$ 10,191+14,475 
$ 97,793  
 * 100 = 25.22% 
Table 7: Cisco Systems, impact executive age on ROA 
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Tobin’s Q increased in 2019 compared to 2016, which might be due to the fact that Charles 
Robbins is more experienced. Tobin’s Q in 2019 shows that the company is more overvalued 
than it was in 2016. For investors, this means that Cisco’s shares might sell themselves for 
more than they are actually worth and trading with these shares is therefore riskier. 
Compared to 2016, the market value was higher, whereas long-term debt and total assets 
were less. As explained earlier, total assets were less in 2019 because of less investments, 
which could be linked to the behavior of older CEOs. Since the market value of Cisco 
Systems has increased, it is important to look at the shares outstanding and the share price 
in 2016 and 2019 to understand this development. In 2016, Cisco Systems had 5.029 bn 
shares outstanding and a closing price at the end of fiscal 2016 (29.07.2016) of $ 30.53 
(Reuters, 2020). In 2019, shares outstanding amounted to 4.250 bn with a closing price at 
the end of fiscal 2019 (26.07.2019) of $ 56.53 (Reuters, 2020). The share price has increased 
by $ 26, which led to a higher market value of the company.  
To test the impact of the control variable on Tobin’s Q, Sales Growth was calculated and 
showed a growth of 5.40%. This could mean that Tobin’s Q was not only positively 
influenced by the executive experience, but also by a growth in sales. 
In conclusion, one can say that the longer-tenured Charles Robbins has probably impacted 
Tobin’s Q positively since Q has increased compared to 2016. It is, however, also possible 
that the increase in Tobin’s Q was caused by a growth in sales. 
 
 
 
Cisco Systems, 
Charles H. 
Robbins 
Executive 
experience 
Tobin’s Q Sales Growth 
fiscal 16 1 year 
$ 153,535+(24,483+4,159)
$ 121,652
 = 1.50 - 
fiscal 19 4 years 
$ 240,253+(14,475+5,998)
$ 97,793
 = 2.67 
$ 51,904−49,247
$ 49,247
 * 100 = 5.4% 
Table 8: Cisco Systems, impact executive experience on Tobin's Q 
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Cisco Systems, 
Charles H. 
Robbins 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
fiscal 18 
$ 0,110  
$ 108,784 
 * 100 = 0.11% 
 
$ 196,418+(20,331+5,238)   
$ 108,784 
 = 2.04 
fiscal 19 
$ 11,621  
$ 97,793  
 * 100 = 11.88% 
$ 240,253+(14,475+5,998)
$ 97,793
 = 2.67 
 
Cisco Systems, 
Charles H. 
Robbins 
Leverage Sales Growth 
fiscal 18 
$ 5,238+20,331  
$ 108,784 
 * 100 = 23.50% - 
fiscal 19 
$ 10,191+14,475 
$ 97,793  
 * 100 = 25.22% 
$ 51,904−49,330
$ 49,330
 * 100 = 5.22% 
 
 
Charles H. Robbins took over the role of the Chairman of the Board on December 2017, 
which means that CEO duality was partly given in fiscal 2018 and completely given in fiscal 
2019. According to Peni, CEO duality has a positive impact on both ROA and Tobin’s Q, 
which is partly the case for Cisco Systems. ROA and Tobin’s Q both increased in 2019 
compared to 2018. The market value of 2018 was calculated as shares outstanding (4.614 
bn) multiplied by the closing price of fiscal 2018 (27.07.2018) of $ 42.57 (Reuters, 2020). 
Compared to 2018, the market value of 2019 was higher, whereas long-term debt and total 
assets were less. ROA of 2019 was higher because of lower total assets, which is again due 
to the fact that Cisco Systems has decreased its investments. Investments in 2018 amounted 
to $ 37,614 M, whereas they amounted to $ 21,663 M in 2019. Moreover, net income was 
significantly higher in 2019, which had a strong positive impact on ROA. Net income in 
2018 was very low due to “provision for income taxes” in the consolidated statements of 
operations, which amounted to $ 12,929 M. This high number was due to a $ 10.4 bn charge 
related to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Cisco, 2018), which was signed into law on December 
22, 2017 by U.S. President Donald Trump (Floyd, 2020). Cisco’s usual figure for “provision 
for income taxes” is $ 2,900 M. Since 2018 was an extraordinary situation for Cisco Systems, 
Table 9: Cisco Systems, impact executive busyness on ROA and Tobin's Q 
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it is very probable that ROA has not increased because of CEO duality, but because Cisco 
Systems has passed this situation. 
Again, the control variable Leverage was used to see whether ROA might have been even 
higher. Leverage showed a slight increase in 2019, which means that ROA was negatively 
impacted by this development. Without the increase in Leverage, ROA might have been 
even higher. The second control variable Sales Growth was calculated to check whether an 
increase in sales caused a higher Tobin’s Q. Sales increased by 5.22%, which could mean 
that the increase in Tobin’s Q is not necessarily due to CEO duality. 
In conclusion, one can observe that it is probable that Robbins’ executive busyness has 
influenced Tobin’s Q of Cisco Systems positively. However, it is not possible to state that 
Charles Robbins has influenced ROA positively since 2018 has been an extraordinary 
situation. 
5.2 Home Depot 
Home Depot, Inc. is a home improvement retailer that sells building materials and home 
improvement products. It operates The Home Depot stores, which are full-service, 
warehouse-style stores with a wide assortment of building materials, home improvement 
products and garden products. Moreover, they provide a number of services, including 
installation services for various kinds of products (Forbes, 2019). 
The current CEO of Home Depot is Craig A. Menear and he is currently 61 years old 
(Reuters, 2020). He took the role of the CEO in November 2014 and was moreover elected 
Chairman of the Board in February 2015 (The Home Depot, w.y.). To test whether Menear’s 
executive age and executive experience have an impact on the performance indicators, the 
indicators of 2015 and 2018 will be compared to each other. Even if Menear was elected 
Chairman of the Board, it is not possible to assess the impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance since there is no period without CEO duality that could be compared to a period 
with CEO duality. To test whether Peni’s findings can be applied to Home Depot and its 
CEO, the figures for 2015 and 2018 will now be provided and analyzed. The figures, given 
in millions, will be taken from the annual reports of 2015 and 2018 provided by Home Depot 
itself. 
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Home Depot, 
Craig A. 
Menear 
Executive age ROA Leverage 
fiscal 15 56 
$ 7,009  
$ 42,549 
 * 100 = 16.47% 
$ 350+20,888 
$ 42,549
 * 100 = 49.91% 
fiscal 18 59 
$ 11,121  
$ 44,003  
 * 100 = 25.27% 
$ 1,339+26,807 
$ 44,003  
 * 100 = 63.96% 
 
 
When comparing the ROA of 2015 and 2018, it is obvious that ROA significantly increased 
by 8.8 percentage points. The ROA of 2018 shows that Home Depot used its total assets 
even more efficient than in 2015 to generate earnings. ROA was higher in 2018 because of 
a higher net income as total assets were nearly the same. The net income, stated as net 
earnings in the annual reports, has increased because of higher net sales. Net sales amounted 
to $ 88,519 M in 2015 and increased by $ 19,684 M, amounting to $ 108,203 M in 2018. As 
mentioned in the theoretical part, older CEOs tend to take limited strategic actions to avoid 
additional risk. However, this can only be partly supported here. In 2018, Home Depot had 
nine store locations in Mexico and four store locations in the U.S. more than in 2015. 
Opening stores in new locations goes along with a certain risk that Craig A. Menear is still 
willing to take, even if he has a higher executive age in 2018. Furthermore, Home Depot has 
initiated several changes in 1,300 stores that are certainly linked to high investments. The 
theory also proposes that older CEOs tend to avoid larger acquisitions, and this can be seen 
here. In 2015, Home Depot acquired Interline for $ 1,700 M. In 2018, the payments for 
acquired businesses amounted to $ 21 M, which is a significant decrease compared to the 
costly acquisition in 15’.   
To test whether ROA might have been even higher, it is necessary to provide the calculations 
for Leverage as well. As already known, Leverage has a negative impact on ROA, so the 
higher Leverage is, the lower ROA gets. In the case of Home Depot, Leverage significantly 
increased in 2018, which means that Leverage influenced ROA negatively in 2018. This, 
however, also means that ROA is not higher because of a lower Leverage, but very probable 
because of a higher executive age.  
In conclusion, one can assume that Craig Menear’s higher executive age has, as proposed by 
Peni, a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
Table 10: Home Depot, impact executive age on ROA 
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Home Depot, 
Craig A. 
Menear 
Executive 
experience 
Tobin’s Q Sales Growth 
fiscal 15 
1 year +  
3 months 
$ 157,452+(20,888+77)
$ 42,549
 = 4.19 - 
fiscal 18 
4 years +  
3 months 
$ 203,729+(26,807+1,056)
$ 44,003
 = 5.26 
$ 108,203−88,519
$ 88,519
 * 100 = 22.24% 
 
 
Tobin’s Q increased significantly in 2018 compared to 2015, which might be due to the fact 
that Craig Menear is more experienced. Tobin’s Q in 2018 shows that the company was even 
more overvalued than it was in 2015. This means that Home Depot’s shares are rather 
unfavorable for investors, because the company’s shares might sell themselves for more than 
they are actually worth and trading with these shares is therefore riskier. Compared to 2015, 
the market value was higher in 2018, such as long-term debt and the current portion of long-
term debt. The market value in 2018 was higher because of a higher share price. In 2018, 
Home Depot had 1.105 bn shares outstanding and a closing price at the end of fiscal 2018 
(01.02.2019) of $ 184.37 (Reuters, 2020). In 2015, shares outstanding amounted to 1.252 bn 
with a closing price at the end of fiscal 2015 (29.01.2016) of $ 125.76 (Reuters, 2020). The 
share price has increased by $ 58.61, which led to a higher market value of the company.  
To test the impact of the control variable on Tobin’s Q, Sales Growth was calculated, and it 
showed a significant growth of 22.24%. This could mean that Tobin’s Q is only higher 
because of the significant increase in sales and not higher because of the longer-tenured 
Menear. 
In conclusion, one can say that the longer-tenured Craig Menear might have impacted 
Tobin’s Q positively.     
5.3 Procter & Gamble 
Procter & Gamble Co. engages in the provision of branded consumer packaged goods to its 
consumers. It offers its products in various segments, including Beauty, Hair, and Personal; 
Grooming; Health Care; Fabric Care and Home Care; and Baby, Feminine and Family Care. 
Many brands that are popular amongst consumers, such as Oral-B, Braun, Head & Shoulders 
and Pampers, all belong to Procter & Gamble (Forbes, 2019).  
Table 11: Home Depot, impact executive experience on Tobin's Q 
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The current CEO of Procter & Gamble is David S. Taylor and he is currently 61 years old 
(Reuters, 2020). He took the role of the CEO in July 2015 (LinkedIn, w.y.) and was moreover 
elected Chairman of the Board at the end of fiscal 2016 (Bloomberg, w.y.). To test whether 
Taylor’s executive age and executive experience have an impact on the performance 
indicators, the indicators of 2016 and 2019 will be compared to each other. As Taylor was 
elected Chairman of the Board, it is possible to test the impact of his executive busyness on 
firm performance. In order to do so, ROA and Tobin’s Q of 2016 and 2017 will be compared 
to each other. To test whether Peni’s findings can be applied to Procter & Gamble and its 
CEO, the figures for 2016, 2017 and 2019 will now be provided and analyzed. The figures, 
given in millions, will be taken from the annual reports of 2016, 2017 and 2019 provided by 
Procter & Gamble itself.   
P&G, David 
S. Taylor 
Executive age ROA Leverage 
fiscal 16 57 
$ 10,604  
$ 127,136 
 * 100 = 8.34% 
$ 11,653+18,945 
$ 127,136
 * 100 = 24.07% 
fiscal 19 60 
$ 3,966  
$ 115,095  
 * 100 = 3.45% 
$ 9,697+20,395 
$ 115,095  
 * 100 = 26.15% 
 
When comparing the ROA of 2016 and 2019, it is obvious that ROA has decreased by 4.89 
percentage points. The ROA of 2019 shows that Procter & Gamble used its total assets less 
efficient than in 2016 to generate earnings. ROA was lower in 2019 because of a significant 
decline in net income. The net income, stated as net earnings in the annual reports, has 
decreased because of a new position in the consolidated statements of earnings of 2019. 
“Goodwill and indefinite lived intangibles impairment charges” amounted to $ 8,345 M, 
which led to a lower operating income and therefore to a lower net income. These 
impairment charges were caused by a write down of the value of Procter & Gamble’s Gillette 
brand. The value of Gillette decreased by $ 8,345 M because of currency devaluations and a 
lower shaving frequency (Lucas, 2019). The theoretical part suggests that older CEOs tend 
to avoid larger acquisitions, which is not the case here. In 2016, cash used to acquire other 
companies amounted to $ 186 M, whereas it amounted to $ 3,945 M in 2019. This shows 
that Taylor is willing to use more cash to acquire companies than he was in 2016, even if he 
is older. Furthermore, the theory also suggests that older CEOs spend less money on 
Research and Development, which is the case here. In 2016, R&D expenses amounted to 
Table 12: Procter & Gamble, impact executive age on ROA 
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1,879 and in 2019 to 1,861. However, when comparing the R&D expenses of the last five 
years, it becomes clear that no matter how old the current CEO is, R&D expenses amount to 
almost the same every year, with the highest R&D expense being 1,991 in 2015.    
The control variable Leverage, used to test whether it might have impacted ROA negatively, 
showed only a small increase of 2.08 percentage points. In this case, the main factor that 
influenced ROA negatively was not the control variable, but the write down of Gillette’s 
value. It might be that ROA would have been higher in 2019 without the impairment charges 
of $ 8 bn. As mentioned earlier, other factors can influence the performance of a company 
and for Procter & Gamble, the main factor is the write down.  
In conclusion, it is not possible to confirm or deny that Taylor’s executive age has a positive 
impact on firm performance. 
  
P&G, David 
S. Taylor 
Executive 
experience 
Tobin’s Q Sales Growth 
fiscal 16 1 year  
$ 226,193+(18,945+2,760)
$ 127,136
 = 1.95 - 
fiscal 19 4 years  
$ 274,344+(20,395+3,388)
$ 115,095
 = 2.59 
$ 67,684−65,299
$ 65,299
 * 100 = 3.65% 
 
 
Tobin’s Q increased in 2019 compared to 2016, which might be due to the fact that David 
S. Taylor is more experienced. Tobin’s Q in 2019 shows that the company was even more 
overvalued than it was in 2016. This means, as for Cisco Systems and Home Depot, that 
P&G’s shares are rather unfavorable for investors. Compared to 2016, the market value was 
higher in 2019, such as long-term debt and the current portion of long-term debt. Total assets, 
however, decreased in 2019. The market value in 2019 was higher because of a higher share 
price. In 2019, Procter & Gamble had 2.502 bn shares outstanding and a closing price at the 
end of fiscal 2019 (28.06.2019) of $ 109.65 (Reuters, 2020). In 2016, shares outstanding 
amounted to 2.668 bn with a closing price at the end of fiscal 2016 (27.06.2016) of $ 84.78 
(Reuters, 2020). The share price has increased by $ 24.87, which led to a higher market value 
of the company.  
To test the impact of the control variable on Tobin’s Q, the growth in sales was calculated, 
which amounted to 3.65%. Since Sales Growth has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q, it might 
be that Tobin’s Q has only increased because of a growth in sales. 
Table 13: Procter & Gamble, impact executive experience on Tobin's Q 
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In conclusion, one can say that the longer-tenured David Taylor might have impacted 
Tobin’s Q positively. 
P&G, David 
S. Taylor 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
fiscal 16 
$ 10,604  
$ 127,136 
 * 100 = 8.34% 
$ 226,193+(18,945+2,760)
$ 127,136
 = 1.95 
fiscal 17 
$ 15,411  
$ 120,406 
 * 100 = 12.80% 
$ 222,233+(18,038+1,676)   
$ 120,406
 = 2.01 
 
P&G, David 
S. Taylor 
Leverage Sales Growth 
fiscal 16 
$ 11,653+18,945 
$ 127,136
 * 100 = 24.07% - 
fiscal 17 
$ 13,554+18,038  
$ 120,406 
 * 100 = 26.24% 
$ 65,058−65,299   
$ 65,299
 * 100 = - 0.37% 
 
 
David S. Taylor took over the role of the Chairman of the Board at the end of fiscal 2016, 
which means that CEO duality is given since fiscal 2017. According to Peni, CEO duality 
has a positive impact on both ROA and Tobin’s Q, which is the case for Procter & Gamble. 
Tobin’s Q was higher in 2017, which indicates that the company was more overvalued than 
in 2016. There was, however, only a slight increase in Tobin’s Q. Compared to 2016, market 
value, total assets and current portion of long-term debt decreased, whereas long-term debt 
was nearly the same in 2017. The market value of 2017 was calculated as shares outstanding 
(2.550 bn) multiplied by the closing price of fiscal 2017 (26.06.2017) of $ 87.15 (Reuters, 
2020). ROA in 2017 was higher because of lower total assets, which was due to the balance 
sheet position “current assets held for sale” ($ 7,185 M) that is no longer available in 2017.  
Again, the control variable Leverage was used to see whether ROA might have been even 
higher. Leverage showed a slight increase in 2017, which means that ROA was negatively 
impacted by this development. Without the increase in Leverage, the executive busyness of 
Taylor might have had an even bigger impact on ROA. The second control variable Sales 
Growth was calculated to check whether an increase in revenues might have led to a higher 
Tobin’s Q, which is, however, not the case for P&G. Sales have declined by 0.37%, 
Table 14: Procter & Gamble, impact executive busyness on ROA and Tobin's Q 
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negatively influencing Tobin’s Q. This, in turn, means that Tobin’s Q is very probable higher 
because of Taylor’s executive busyness. 
In conclusion, one can observe that it is very probable that Taylor’s executive busyness 
influences the ROA of Procter & Gamble positively. Moreover, it is also possible that 
Tobin’s Q is positively impacted by CEO duality.  
5.4 Johnson & Johnson 
Johnson & Johnson engages in research and development, manufacture and sale of personal 
care hygienic products, pharmaceuticals and surgical equipment. The company operates 
through the following business segments: Consumer (e.g. baby care, skin care and wound 
care), Pharmaceutical (e.g. anti-infective and antipsychotic products) and Medical Devices 
(e.g. neurological and infection prevention products) (Forbes, 2019).  
The current CEO of Johnson & Johnson is Alex Gorsky and he is currently 58 years old 
(Reuters, 2020). He took the role of the CEO in April 2012 and was moreover elected 
Chairman of the Board in December 2012 (IBM, w.y.). To test whether Gorsky’s executive 
age and executive experience have an impact on the performance indicators, the indicators 
of 2014 and 2019 will be compared to each other. Even if Gorsky was elected Chairman of 
the Board, it is not possible to assess the impact of CEO duality on firm performance since 
there is no period without CEO duality that could be compared to a period with CEO duality. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to test the impact of Gorsky’s external board seat on the 
performance indicator Tobin’s Q. Gorsky is since 2014 part of the board of directors of 
International Business Machines Corporation, better known as IBM (IBM, w.y.). Therefore, 
it will be tested whether the external board seat has a negative impact in fiscal 2015, 
compared to fiscal 2014. To test whether Peni’s findings can be applied to Johnson & 
Johnson and its CEO, the figures for 2014, 2015 and 2019 will now be provided and 
analyzed. The figures, given in millions, will be taken from the annual reports of 2014, 2015 
and 2019 provided by Johnson & Johnson itself.  
Johnson & 
Johnson, 
Alex Gorsky 
Executive age ROA Leverage 
fiscal 14 52 
$ 16,323  
$ 131,119 
 * 100 = 12.45% 
$ 11,271+15,122 
$ 131,119
 * 100 = 20.13% 
fiscal 19 57 
$ 15,119  
$ 157,728  
 * 100 = 9.59% 
$ 9,746+26,494 
$ 157,728 
 * 100 = 22.98% 
Table 15: Johnson & Johnson, impact executive age on ROA 
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When comparing the ROA of 2014 and 2019, it is obvious that ROA decreased by 2.86 
percentage points. The ROA of 2019 shows that Johnson & Johnson used its total assets less 
efficient than in 2015 to generate earnings. ROA was lower in 2019 because of higher total 
assets since the net income was nearly the same. Total assets were higher in 2019 because 
of two balance sheet positions that increased compared to 2014. These positions are: 
“Intangible assets, net” (2014: $ 27,222 M vs 2019: $ 47,643 M) and “Goodwill” (2014: $ 
21,832 M vs. 2019: $ 33,639 M). The reason for the increase in “intangible assets, net” was 
a higher amount of “patents and trademarks – gross”, which increased by $ 27,560 M. 
“Goodwill” increased because of a higher goodwill of Johnson & Johnson’s segments with 
the highest increase in the pharmaceutical segment (2014: $ 2,626 M vs. 2019: $ 9,169 M). 
The theoretical part suggests that older CEOs tend to avoid larger acquisitions, which is not 
the case here. The consolidated statements of cash flows of 2014 show that $ 2,129 M were 
used for acquisitions. The same position in the consolidated statements of cash flows of 2019 
amounted to $ 5,810 M, which is an increase compared to 2014. This clearly shows that 
Gorsky is still willing to acquire new businesses, even if he has a higher executive age in 
2019.  
The control variable Leverage, used to test whether it might have impacted ROA negatively, 
showed a small increase of 2.85 percentage points. This means that the higher executive age 
of Gorsky could have had a positive impact on ROA without the increase in Leverage.  
In conclusion, the higher executive age of Alex Gorsky has not impacted ROA positively, 
which can, however, be due to the fact that Leverage has increased.  
Johnson & 
Johnson, 
Alex Gorsky 
Executive 
experience 
Tobin’s Q Sales Growth 
fiscal 14 
2 years +  
8 months  
$ 295,744+(15,122+3,638+7)
$ 131,119
 = 2.40 - 
fiscal 19 
7 years +  
8 months  
$ 385,509+(26,494+1,202+1,100)
$ 157,728
 = 2.63 
$ 82,059−74,331
$ 74,331
 * 100 = 10.40% 
 
 
Tobin’s Q increased in 2019 compared to 2014, which might be due to the fact that Alex 
Gorsky is way more experienced. Tobin’s Q in 2019 shows that the company was even more 
overvalued than it was in 2014. This means, as for every other company that was tested in 
the empirical part, that Johnson & Johnson’s shares are rather unfavorable for investors. 
Table 16: Johnson & Johnson, impact executive experience on Tobin's Q 
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Compared to 2014, the market value was higher in 2019, such as long-term debt, the current 
portion of long-term debt and total assets. Only notes payable decreased compared to 2014. 
The market value in 2019 was higher because of a higher share price. In 2019, Johnson & 
Johnson had 2.645 bn shares outstanding and a closing price at the end of fiscal 2019 
(27.12.2019) of $ 145.75 (Reuters, 2020). In 2014, shares outstanding amounted to 2.815 bn 
with a closing price at the end of fiscal 2014 (26.12.2014) of $ 105.06 (Reuters, 2020). The 
share price has increased by $ 40.69, which led to a higher market value of the company.  
To test the impact of the control variable on Tobin’s Q, the growth in sales was calculated, 
which amounted to 10.40%. Since Sales Growth has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q, it might 
be that Tobin’s Q has only increased because of a growth in sales. 
In conclusion, one can say that the longer-tenured Alex Gorsky might have impacted Tobin’s 
Q positively.  
Johnson & 
Johnson, 
Alex Gorsky 
Tobin’s Q Sales Growth 
fiscal 14 
$ 295,744+(15,122+3,638+7)
$ 131,119
 = 2.40 - 
fiscal 15 
$ 284,740+(12,857+7,004+2,104)
$ 133,411
 = 2.30 
$ 70,074−74,331   
$ 74,331
 * 100 = - 5.73% 
 
 
Tobin’s Q decreased in 2015 compared to 2014, which might be due to Alex Gorsky’s 
external board seat. Tobin’s Q in 2015 shows that the company was less overvalued, which 
makes Johnson & Johnson’s shares more attractive for possible investors. Compared to 
2014, the market value was lower, such as long-term debt. By contrast, notes payable, the 
current portion of long-term debt and total assets increased. The market value in 2015 was 
lower because of a lower share price. In 2015, Johnson & Johnson had 2.772 bn shares 
outstanding and a closing price at the last day of 2015 of $ 102.72 (Reuters, 2020). Since 
there is no data available for the closing price at the end of fiscal 2015 (03.01.2016) the 
nearest possible date and its closing price were chosen. The share price has decreased by $ 
2.34, which led to a lower market value in 2015.  
To test the impact of the control variable on Tobin’s Q, the growth in sales was calculated, 
which showed a decline of 5.73%. A decline in sales has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q, 
which might mean that Tobin’s Q is not necessarily lower because of Gorsky’s external 
board seat, but because of a decline in sales. 
Table 17: Johnson & Johnson, impact executive busyness on Tobin's Q 
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According to Peni, Tobin’s Q should be worse in 2015 as Gorsky has an external board 
responsibility and this is the case here. 
5.5 Summary of test 
The empirical part shows that the performance indicators behave in almost all cases as 
proposed by Emilia Peni, which might lead to the conclusion that the chosen CEO 
characteristics truly have a strong impact on firm performance. It is, however, impossible to 
assess whether the indicators are solely influenced by the tested CEO characteristics, or 
whether external factors and/or the control variables Leverage, and Sales Growth have had 
a stronger impact on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Peni proposes that older CEOs have a positive impact on ROA, which is, however, only the 
case for Cisco Systems and Home Depot. Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson do not 
support Peni’s finding since their ROA has decreased. Especially for Procter & Gamble, it 
becomes clear that external factors can have a more significant impact on ROA than a CEO’s 
higher executive age. In 2019, Procter & Gamble reported impairment charges that 
amounted to $ 8,345 M, caused by a write down of Gillette’s value. These impairment 
charges led to a lower net income, which consequently led to a lower ROA. Johnson & 
Johnson’s ROA was, on the other hand, negatively influenced by an increase in total assets, 
caused by higher intangible assets and a higher goodwill.  
The theoretical part also states that a CEO’s executive experience has a positive impact on 
the firm performance indicator Tobin’s Q, which cannot be assessed clearly. All four 
companies showed a higher Tobin’s Q, which might mean that their longer-tenured CEOs 
have really impacted Tobin’s Q positively. Nevertheless, all four companies reported a 
growth in sales and as known from the theoretical part, Sales Growth has a positive impact 
on Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the impact of Sales Growth on Tobin’s Q is given at a 0.01 
significance level, which means that there is a 99% chance that Sales Growth has a positive 
impact on Tobin’s Q. The impact of the executive experience on Tobin’s Q, on the other 
hand, is given at a 0.05 significance level, which means that there is only a 95% chance that 
the executive experience has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. It is therefore very probable 
that Tobin’s Q has increased because of a growth in sales and not because of longer-tenured 
CEOs. This means that it is not possible to state that Peni’s finding can really be seen.  
Eventually, the impact of a CEO’s executive busyness could be tested on three companies. 
According to Peni, CEO duality has a positive impact on ROA and Tobin’s Q, whereas 
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external board responsibilities have a negative impact on Tobin’s Q. CEO duality was tested 
on Cisco Systems and Procter & Gamble. Both showed an increase in ROA and an increase 
in Tobin’s Q. Nevertheless, it is not possible to say that the executive busyness of Cisco 
Systems’ CEO has influenced ROA positively. ROA was significantly low in the fiscal year 
before CEO duality, which was due to an extraordinary amount of “provision for income 
taxes”, which was related to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. ROA in the year of CEO duality 
was only higher because net income was not influenced by any extraordinary amount 
anymore. Tobin’s Q showed an increase in the year of CEO duality. However, Cisco Systems 
reported a growth in sales in the year of CEO duality, which could again mean that Tobin’s 
Q was only higher because of the growth in sales. Eventually, Tobin’s Q of Johnson & 
Johnson showed a decrease in the year of Alex Gorsky’s external board responsibility. 
However, a decline in sales was reported, which could mean that Tobin’s Q was not 
necessarily influenced by an external board responsibility, but by a decline in sales. 
All in one, it becomes very clear that it is impossible to confirm Peni’s findings regarding 
the impact, even if almost all performance indicators have behaved as proposed. The main 
goal was to see whether the impact on the firm performance indicators is as strong as 
proposed in the theoretical part. The empirical part results in stating that the chosen CEO 
characteristics might impact the performance of U.S.-American companies, but that the 
impact is inferior to the impact of other variables, such as external influences and the control 
variables Leverage and Sales Growth. Since Peni’s study is only focusing on the mentioned 
CEO characteristics and neglecting external influences, the empirical part ends by stating 
that a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive busyness has no strong 
impact on the performance of U.S.-American firms. From an investors point of view, it is 
not recommendable to solely rely on the statistical findings since it is not clear what really 
impacts the performance of a firm. This bachelor’s thesis sees it as more important to focus 
on the company as a whole and to include external factors than solely base an investment 
decision on a CEO and his characteristics.  
6 Summary  
The final chapter of the bachelor’s thesis should provide a summary of the theoretical and 
empirical part, as well as a critical examination regarding the findings, information about the 
reliability and validity and a final conclusion. 
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6.1 Summary of research 
A CEO, who is the person with the highest rank in a business company, has certain 
characteristics that might affect the business company’s performance positively or 
negatively. This bachelor’s thesis focused on a CEO’s executive age, executive experience 
and executive busyness and linked different behaviors to the single characteristics. 
Compared to younger CEOs, older CEOs tend to take limited strategic actions, they might 
classify larger acquisitions as unfavorable since they can go along with a higher risk and 
they tend to keep their upcoming retirement in mind, which means that short-term projects 
are preferred. The executive experience means whether a CEO is longer-tenured or still in 
his early tenure. According to the theory, longer-tenured CEOs are unwilling to initiate new 
changes, whereas CEOs in their early tenure try to exert their power by making major 
changes within the company, such as implementing a new strategy. The executive busyness, 
measured through CEO duality, can be approached through two different theories, namely 
agency and stewardship theory. The agency theory proposes that CEO duality diminishes 
the power of the board of directors and hinders the alignment of both the interests of the 
CEO and the shareholders. The stewardship theory, on the other hand, proposes that CEO 
duality ensures more authority and leads to an even higher motivation to act in accordance 
with the owners interests and goals. Investors who analyze an investment option by looking 
at the company’s CEO and his characteristics, should necessarily keep in mind that not every 
CEO acts according to the theory. Especially while analyzing the CEOs for the empirical 
part, it became clear that it is not possible to generalize the theoretical findings. By contrast 
to the presented theory, older CEOs, for instance, are still willing to acquire new businesses, 
they implement changes in their organization, even if these changes are linked to high 
investments and they are still willing to improve the existing business to satisfy the 
company’s stakeholders even more.  
Looking at certain CEO characteristics and the behavior that is linked to these, was only one 
part of this bachelor’s thesis. The main part consisted of analyzing a study that has already 
examined the relationship between the chosen CEO characteristics and firm performance 
and examining how strong the impact of these characteristics on firm performance is. The 
analysis of the relationship was approached by using Emilia Peni’s study and her statistical 
findings. Firm performance was defined as ROA and Tobin’s Q and two control variables, 
namely Leverage and Sales Growth were used to test whether firm performance might be 
influenced by other factors except the mentioned CEO characteristics. Peni’s study reports 
that a relationship between a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive 
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busyness and the firm performance in the United States can be seen. Moreover, the study 
proposes that a CEO’s executive age has a positive impact on ROA, such as the executive 
experience, which has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. A CEO’s executive busyness has in 
the case of CEO duality a positive impact on both ROA and Tobin’s Q. External board 
responsibilities, however, have a negative impact on Tobin’s Q. All in one, the incorporated 
study proposes that a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and executive busyness 
strongly impacts the firm performance in the United States of America. Solely looking at the 
theoretical part and its suggestions, it is advisable for investors to consider a CEO’s 
executive age, experience and busyness when evaluating an investment option. 
To test how strong the impact of the chosen CEO characteristics on firm performance truly 
is, a test with four S&P 500 companies was conducted and the results showed that it is not 
possible to confirm Peni’s findings regarding the impact. While conducting the test, it soon 
became apparent that one has to have a closer look at the financial statements of a company 
in order to say whether only the characteristics have influenced the performance indicators. 
It is still impossible to say whether ROA, for instance, has really increased because of a 
higher executive age or if other factors have influenced the performance positively. It 
became very clear that it is a necessity to look out for external factors that could influence 
the firm’s operations and consequently the firm’s performance. It moreover showed that it 
is not possible to say what really caused a change in the performance indicators, if it was, as 
suggested, the characteristics or rather the control variables. After conducting the test, this 
bachelor’s thesis suggests that investors should not attach great importance to the 
characteristics of a CEO, but rather look out for external factors that can truly influence the 
performance of a firm. 
Summarized, one can say that from a theoretical point of view, a CEO’s executive age, 
executive experience and executive busyness strongly impacts the firm performance in the 
United States of America. The practical test, however, does not support the proposed strong 
impact and the reasons for this will be discussed in the following chapter. 
6.2 Critical examination  
There are various reasons why the empirical result cannot support the study’s result and 
clearly state that the chosen CEO characteristics strongly impact the firm performance. First 
of all, as Peni already states in her limitations, there might be other CEO characteristics that 
have more impact on firm performance than the introduced ones. Other characteristics, e.g. 
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gender, education and origin might impact firm performance more than the age, experience 
and busyness. It could moreover be that the gender, for instance, has a statistically stronger 
impact on ROA than the executive age, which makes it impossible to say to which degree 
what characteristic impacted the firm performance indicator. It is therefore necessary to not 
focus on only a limited number of characteristics, but to analyze all possible characteristics 
and to assess thoroughly which ones have what impact on firm performance. Moreover, it 
might be that a CEO has an impact on firm performance, but the chosen indicators in Peni’s 
study are not the right representatives for the performance. There are various studies that 
report about the misuse of Tobin’s Q as a performance indicator. Robert P. Bartlett and Frank 
Partnoy from the University of California, report fifty pages long about the misuse of Tobin’s 
Q as an indicator for firm value. This raises the question whether it makes sense to test the 
impact of a CEO’s executive experience and busyness on Tobin’s Q if Tobin’s Q is 
questioned to be a good firm performance indicator. Eventually, the study neglects external 
factors that can influence the performance of a company positively or negatively. While 
conducting the empirical part, it became obvious that certain developments have more 
impact on the performance indicators than any characteristics. New legislations, like the 
enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, social changes, like changes in consumer behavior, 
which for instance caused a write down of Gillette’s value, or outstanding situations, with 
the most recent situation being the Corona virus, all have a positive or negative impact on 
the performance indicators. The empirical test clearly showed that it is impossible to say to 
which degree the characteristics have influenced the firm performance of U.S.-American 
companies.  
6.3 Reliability and validity  
The reliability of this bachelor’s thesis is high, but limited. The theoretical part was based 
on several studies and to answer the main research question from a theoretical point of view, 
a scientific study, that was moreover published in a journal, was used. This means that the 
theoretical part is highly reliable since statistically proven information were used. The 
empirical part, on the other hand, used the statistically proven information and obtained the 
financial numbers for determining the performance indicators from the companies’ annual 
reports. Annual reports are published by the company itself and their correctness is checked 
by external auditors, which makes the provided numbers highly reliable.  
The reliability is limited since the statistical findings and the empirical result can solely be 
applied to the United States and to companies that are listed on the S&P 500 index. 
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Furthermore, incorporating more control variables, except Leverage and Sales Growth, 
could have led to another result as well as testing the relationship on more than four 
companies. It could be that, by coincidence, only the four chosen companies do not support 
the statistical findings and other companies would support them.  
The presented outcome of this bachelor’s thesis should be valid since the study was correctly 
analyzed and the empirical part was based on the study’s information. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to determine whether the result is truly valid, as there are no sources that have tested 
the relationship in the same way as the empirical part.  
6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is not possible to state that a CEO’s executive age, executive experience 
and executive busyness has a strong impact on the firm performance in the United States of 
America. There might be, as proposed by Emilia Peni, an impact on firm performance, 
however, a CEO and his characteristics are inferior to other factors that have definitely a 
stronger impact on the firm performance. External influences will indisputably always 
strongly influence a firm’s performance positively or negatively, no matter how old, 
experienced or busy the current CEO is. Especially after conducting the empirical part, this 
bachelor’s thesis is of the opinion that the introduced CEO characteristics have a rather weak 
impact on the performance of U.S.-American companies. 
This bachelor’s thesis was focusing on the United States of America, even though European 
countries, such as Germany and Finland, would have been more natural. The CEO in the 
United States is the representative of a company and is more and more the investigated 
subject of various studies. European countries, such as the mentioned ones, put less emphasis 
on the CEO and that is why less research has been done so far. The lack of statistically 
proven information has therefore led this bachelor’s thesis to focus primarily on the United 
States of America in order to be able to answer the main research question. This thesis can 
only state that certain CEO characteristics have no strong impact on the firm performance in 
the United States of America. It could be that in Germany, for instance, the impact of certain 
characteristics is more evident than in the U.S. It is, however, for sure that a CEO’s 
characteristics cannot outweigh the influence of external factors, no matter in which country 
the impact is examined.  
When it comes to the investors and whether they should keep the relationship and impact in 
mind, this bachelor’s thesis proposes to base an investment decision not on the statistical 
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findings, but rather on external factors that could impact the firm’s performance and 
consequently the investor’s return on investment. Additionally, investors should use proven 
ratios that are common in the financial world, such as the P/E Ratio, rather than examining 
a CEO and his characteristics. If investors still want to take a possible impact of certain CEO 
characteristics on firm performance into consideration, it is recommendable to question the 
study and its chosen approach. As seen in the critical examination, not every chosen 
performance indicator is the right one to represent firm performance and investors should 
make further research on whether the study’s approach is the right one to examine the 
relationship.  
All in one, it is not impossible that a CEO’s executive age, executive experience and 
executive busyness has an impact on the firm performance in the United States of America. 
However, it is for sure that this impact is rather weak and moreover inferior to the impact of 
other influences.  
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